Diplomatic Briefing· Türkiye UN Security Council reform the world is bigger than five

The World Is Bigger Than Five: Türkiye on UN Security Council Reform, Gaza Diplomacy and COP31

Türkiye's case for UN Security Council reform under 'the world is bigger than five', plus its Gaza diplomacy, Zero Waste agenda and COP31 role.

R&P

By Regions & Powers Editorial Team

Published: October 26, 2026

⏱ 8 min read (1,662 words)

The Brief — Key Takeaways

Türkiye's doctrine 'The world is bigger than five' argues that a Security Council built around five veto-wielding permanent members cannot represent a UN of 193 member states.
Ankara belongs to the Uniting for Consensus group and favours more elected, rotating seats and veto restraint rather than new permanent seats.
Any change to the UN Charter needs a two-thirds General Assembly vote and ratification by two-thirds of members, including all five permanent members (Article 108).
Türkiye applies the same 'wider representation' logic to Gaza diplomacy, the UN-recognised International Day of Zero Waste (30 March) and its role as host of COP31 in Antalya in 2026.
Türkiye's multi-regional diplomacy runs through the Organization of Turkic States, Africa partnership summits and Gulf relations, which it presents as support for its reform agenda.

Why It Matters

Türkiye's doctrine 'The world is bigger than five' (Dünya beşten büyüktür) holds that the UN Security Council, built in 1945 around five permanent veto-holders, no longer represents a UN of 193 members. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeated the phrase in UN General Assembly speeches and in his 2021 book on global governance. Ankara links it to concrete files: the Gaza war and the veto, the Zero Waste initiative, and its role as host of the COP31 climate conference. This article sets out the facts first, then the positions of the permanent members and reform groups, then Ankara's own stated position.

Background

The Council's structure comes from the 1945 UN Charter and has been enlarged only once. The key milestones are:

1945: The Charter created a Council of 11, with five permanent members (China, France, the Soviet Union/now Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) and six elected members. Article 27(3) gives permanent members a veto over substantive decisions.
1965: An amendment to Article 23, adopted by the General Assembly in 1963, entered into force and raised the Council to 15 members: the five permanent plus ten non-permanent members elected for two-year terms by regional group.
2005: The African Union's Ezulwini Consensus called for two permanent seats with full prerogatives, including the veto, and five additional non-permanent seats for Africa. A draft resolution by the G4 group failed to reach a vote the same year.
2009: The General Assembly launched the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) on Council reform. They address five clusters: categories of membership, the veto, regional representation, Council size and working methods, and Council–Assembly relations.
2024: The Pact for the Future, adopted by UN leaders in September, included a commitment to reform the Council and to redress Africa's historical under-representation. It set no model or timetable.

The procedural hurdle is Article 108. A Charter amendment needs a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of member states, including all five permanent members. Each permanent member therefore holds an effective veto over its own reform.

Türkiye has served on the Council as an elected member several times, most recently in 2009–2010. It lost a contested election for 2015–2016 and has announced a candidacy for 2033–2034.

Key Players & Positions

Reform positions fall into four camps, and the permanent members are not aligned with each other. The summaries below reflect the states' own public statements and are simplified.

Actor	Stated position (own sources)
United States	Since 2022, US officials at the UN have backed expansion in both categories. In 2024 the US ambassador announced support for two permanent African seats without veto initially, plus a rotating seat for small island developing states.
United Kingdom	Supports new permanent seats for Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, a permanent African presence, and more elected seats.
France	Supports expansion in both categories and, with Mexico, promotes voluntary veto restraint in mass-atrocity situations.
Russia	Says it supports greater representation for Asia, Africa and Latin America and backs the aspirations of India and Brazil. It insists any outcome must command broad consensus rather than be imposed by vote.
China	Says it backs greater representation for developing countries, especially in Africa, and opposes artificial deadlines or forced votes.
G4 (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan)	Seek permanent seats for themselves and more seats overall.
African Group	Ezulwini Consensus: two permanent seats with veto and five non-permanent seats.
Uniting for Consensus (UfC)	Opposes new permanent seats. Proposes a larger Council with longer-term, re-electable non-permanent seats. Members have included Italy, Pakistan, Argentina, Spain, Canada, South Korea and Türkiye.

The central disagreement is whether to add permanent members or to expand elected seats. A second, parallel dispute concerns whether new permanent members would receive the veto.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Treaties & Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Ankara argues that legitimacy requires rotation, regional balance and limits on the veto, not an enlarged club of permanent members. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the Presidency, the position has five main elements:

A larger, more representative Council without new permanent seats. Erdoğan's General Assembly addresses and his book A Fairer World Is Possible propose a Council in which all regions are represented and membership rotates, so that no state is permanently excluded or permanently privileged. This matches the UfC approach. The legal basis Ankara cites is the sovereign equality of states in Article 2(1) of the Charter, with Articles 23 and 108 as the amendment route.
Veto restraint and a stronger General Assembly. Erdoğan has argued in UN speeches that vetoes have blocked action in Syria, Ukraine and Gaza. Ankara supports greater Assembly involvement when the Council is deadlocked, as in General Assembly resolution 377(V) 'Uniting for Peace' (1950).
Gaza and Palestine. Türkiye recognised the State of Palestine in 1988. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, it seeks an immediate ceasefire, unhindered humanitarian access and a two-state settlement on the 1967 lines with East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine. Ankara announced in 2024 that it would intervene in the ICJ case brought by South Africa under the Genocide Convention. It also took part, alongside Egypt, Qatar and the US, in the October 2025 Sharm el-Sheikh ceasefire arrangements. Türkiye does not designate Hamas as a terrorist organization, unlike the US and the EU.
Zero Waste and climate. The Zero Waste initiative, championed by First Lady Emine Erdoğan, led to a UN Secretary-General's Advisory Board (2020). In December 2022 the General Assembly adopted resolution 77/161, which established 30 March as the International Day of Zero Waste. Türkiye ratified the Paris Agreement in 2021 and set a net-zero target for 2053. Under the arrangement reached at COP30 in Belém, Türkiye hosts COP31 in Antalya in November 2026, while Australia leads the negotiations track. The Turkish Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change Ministry coordinates preparations.
Multi-regional diplomacy as a reform argument. Türkiye helped found the Turkic Council (2009), renamed the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) in 2021. Its members are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye and Uzbekistan. It has also expanded its embassy network in Africa and hosted Türkiye–Africa Partnership Summits (2008, 2014, 2021). It maintains close ties with Qatar, including a military base in Doha, and with other Gulf states. Ankara presents these ties as proof that influential states exist outside the P5 club. Its mediation record, including the Istanbul grain talks, is covered in The Montreux Convention, Black Sea Security and the Grain Initiative.

Source Comparison

International and Turkish sources agree that the Council is deadlocked, but they diverge on remedies and on Türkiye's motives.

Issue	Common international framing	Turkish official framing
Council reform	Reform is stalled by rivalries among aspirants (G4 versus UfC) and by P5 reluctance.	The deadlock results from privileging permanent status. Rotation and elected seats are the fairer solution.
Veto	Needed for great-power buy-in, but increasingly criticised after Ukraine and Gaza.	The veto must be restrained, since it produces paralysis in humanitarian crises.
Gaza diplomacy	Israel and several Western governments criticise Ankara's contacts with Hamas and its trade restrictions on Israel. Others credit Türkiye with mediation influence.	Ankara frames its role as humanitarian and as mediation based on international law, and calls for ending the war.
Climate leadership	Analysts note Türkiye's late Paris ratification and continued coal use.	Ankara points to its net-zero 2053 target, its climate legislation and the Zero Waste UN resolution.
Regional diplomacy	Sometimes read as a bid for a sphere of influence.	Presented as partnership-based diplomacy that widens participation in global governance.

Where sources conflict, check the primary documents: UN resolutions, Charter text, Turkish Foreign Ministry statements and the UN's own records. This is the approach described in our Editorial Principles. For corrections to common claims about Türkiye, see our Fact Check guide.

Permanent Five (P5): China, France, Russia, the UK and the US, the only holders of the veto under Article 27(3).
Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN): The General Assembly process on Council reform, running since 2009.
Uniting for Consensus (UfC): A group of states opposing new permanent seats.
Ezulwini Consensus: The African Union's common position, calling for two permanent African seats.
Zero Waste: A Türkiye-launched policy framework for waste prevention, recognised by UN resolution 77/161.
COP31: The 31st UN climate conference, to be hosted by Türkiye in Antalya.
OTS: The Organization of Turkic States, a cooperation body of Turkic-speaking states.

Related reading: Eastern Mediterranean and the Blue Homeland for Türkiye's maritime-law approach, The Montreux Convention and Black Sea security for its mediation record, and About Regions & Powers for our methodology.

Regions & Powers presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources.

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

Index of Nations: 'The World Is Bigger Than Five': Türkiye's UN Security Council Reform Vision and COP31 Climate Diplomacy — How the UN Security Council and veto work, what G4, Uniting for Consensus and Africa propose, and Türkiye's 'world is bigger than five' thesis and COP31 role.
Regional Order: The World Is Bigger Than Five: Türkiye's UN Security Council Reform Proposal, Gaza Diplomacy and COP31 — Türkiye's 'The world is bigger than five' case for UN Security Council reform, plus Gaza diplomacy, Zero Waste and COP31, explained with official sources.
The Nations Dialogue: 'The World Is Bigger Than Five': Türkiye's UN Security Council Reform Case and COP31 Climate Diplomacy — Understand Türkiye's 'The world is bigger than five' doctrine, the P5, L.69 and Uniting for Consensus positions, plus Zero Waste and COP31 climate diplomacy.

Frequently asked questions

What does 'The world is bigger than five' mean?

It is President Erdoğan's slogan-turned-doctrine arguing that five permanent members cannot speak for 193 UN member states. It underpins Türkiye's call for a more representative, accountable and rotating Security Council, and for limits on the veto.

Does Türkiye want a permanent seat on the Security Council?

No. Türkiye belongs to the Uniting for Consensus group, which opposes creating new permanent seats. Ankara favours expanding the number of elected seats and rotating membership so that more states, including Türkiye, can serve.

Why is Security Council reform so hard to achieve?

Article 108 of the UN Charter requires a two-thirds General Assembly vote and ratification by two-thirds of members, including all five permanent members. Aspirants and rival groups also disagree on whether to add permanent seats and whether new members would receive the veto.

What is Türkiye's role in Gaza diplomacy?

According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Türkiye calls for a ceasefire, humanitarian access and a two-state settlement on the 1967 lines. It announced an intervention in the ICJ case on Gaza and took part in the October 2025 Sharm el-Sheikh ceasefire arrangements. Israel and some Western states criticise Ankara's contacts with Hamas.

What is Türkiye's role at COP31?

Under the arrangement agreed at COP30 in Belém, Türkiye hosts COP31 in Antalya in November 2026, while Australia leads the negotiations track. Ankara plans to showcase its Zero Waste initiative and its net-zero 2053 target, though analysts note continued reliance on fossil fuels.

What is the International Day of Zero Waste?

It is a UN observance held each year on 30 March, established by General Assembly resolution 77/161 in December 2022 on a proposal led by Türkiye. UNEP and UN-Habitat jointly facilitate it, and it was first observed in 2023.

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